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INTRODUCTION 
Businesses, healthcare providers, and others gather, store, and 
use our data every day. In the process, these entities may end up 
committing privacy harms. For example, Equifax might fail to utilize 
proper measures to safeguard your credit information, leaving it 
vulnerable to hacking. Or a Health Maintenance Organization 
employee might negligently leave a laptop with your health 
information on an airplane. Perhaps a retail store decides to sell 
information about your purchases to a third party without your 
permission. What should be the consequence of these privacy harms? 
And what is the best legal mechanism for addressing them? 
The privacy regulation question is the subject of vigorous current 
debate. The widespread gathering of data about consumers and its 
use in business activities, including behavioral advertising, concerns 
privacy advocates. Such use of consumer data appears invasive, and 
even potentially deceptive, leading to calls for more vigorous 
regulation through the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), the 
states, common law actions, and new legislation.1 Adding to the 
consternation of privacy advocates is a rash of reports of security 
breaches at a variety of retail firms, leading to hackers and other 
unintended third parties gaining access to consumer information.2 As 
a result, an explosion of consumer data privacy legislation has been 
introduced in Congress recently, 3  and many more legislative 
 
 1. See, e.g., Jeri Clausing, Report Rings Alarm Bells About Privacy on the Internet, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2000, at C10 (noting privacy advocates’ arguments that self-regulation 
is insufficient). A number of privacy organizations have been actively involved in 
advocacy. See Angelique Carson, Changing Tactics: The Rise of the Privacy Advocates, 
THE INT’L ASS’N OF PRIVACY PROF’LS (Sept. 23, 2013), https://iapp.org/news/a/changing-
tactics-the-rise-of-the-privacy-advocates/ [https://perma.cc/KP5Z-QYUN] (mentioning, 
through reference to a single example, the advocacy work of EPIC, the Center for Digital 
Democracy, Consumer Watchdog, Patient Privacy Rights, US PIRG, and the Privacy 
Rights Clearinghouse). 
 2. See Identity Theft Resource Center Breach Report Hits Record High in 2014, 
IDENTITY THEFT RES. CTR., http://www.idtheftcenter.org/ITRC-Surveys-Studies
/2014databreaches.html [https://perma.cc/33V3-7DRA]. 
 3. See, e.g., Consumer Privacy Protection Act of 2015, H.R. 2977, 114th Cong. 
(2015); Data Security Act of 2015, H.R. 2205, 114th Cong. (2015); Consumer Privacy 
Protection Act of 2015, S. 1158, 114th Cong. (2015); Data Breach Notification and 
Punishing Cyber Criminals Act of 2015, S. 1027, 114th Cong. (2015); Data Security Act of 
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proposals have been introduced at the state level.4 More than half of 
states now have data disposal laws to ensure that information content 
is protected, and at least thirteen states have data security laws that 
regulate how data is stored, maintained, and used.5 These proposed 
and enacted laws provide strong evidence that consumer data issues 
currently rank highly on the agenda of many lawmakers. 
On the other side of the debate, pro-business advocates caution 
that stringent privacy protections can unduly hamstring the 
development of highly valuable technological innovations to the 
ultimate detriment of consumers.6 Bolstering their arguments, some 
scholars question the extent to which privacy regulations are 
 
2015, S. 961, 114th Cong. (2015); Data Security and Breach Notification Act of 2015, H.R. 
1770, 114th Cong. (2015); Personal Data Notification and Protection Act of 2015, H.R. 
1704, 114th Cong. (2015); Data Security and Breach Notification Act of 2015, S. 117, 114th 
Cong. (2015); Personal Data Protection and Breach Accountability Act of 2014, S. 1995, 
113th Cong. (2014); Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2014, H.R. 3990, 113th 
Cong. (2014); Data Security and Breach Notification Act of 2014, S. 1976, 113th Cong. 
(2014); Data Security Act of 2014, S. 1927, 113th Cong. (2014); Personal Data Privacy and 
Security Act of 2014, S. 1897, 113th Cong. (2014). 
 4. See State Laws Related to Internet Privacy, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES (June 20, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-
information-technology/state-laws-related-to-internet-privacy.aspx [https://perma.cc/5592-
D9ZV] (tracking new and proposed state privacy law). 
 5. Data Security Laws—Private Sector, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES (Jan. 16, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-
information-technology/data-security-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/78VX-75Z9]. In addition, 
half of the states prevent employers and/or universities from conditioning work or 
educational opportunities on having access to student or employee personal internet 
accounts. State Social Media Privacy Laws, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES (May 5, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-
information-technology/state-laws-prohibiting-acess-to-social-media-usernanes-and-
passwords.aspx [https://perma.cc/49U8-F39M]. Several states have begun to prohibit the 
private use of GPS tracking systems without the target’s consent. Pam Greenberg, NAT’L 
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, Private Use of Mobile Tracking Devices, 24 
LEGISBRIEF, no. 43 (Nov. 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/documents/legisbriefs/2016/lb
_2443.pdf [https://perma.cc/jrl6-g7nr]. 
 6. See, e.g., Ed Burns, Data Collection Practices Spark Debate on Big Data Ethics, 
Privacy, SEARCHBUSINESSANALYTICS (Apr. 2014), http://searchbusinessanalytics
.techtarget.com/feature/Data-collection-practices-spark-debate-on-big-data-ethics-privacy 
[https://perma.cc/V5YT-BCS9] (quoting Mike Zaneis, then-Executive Vice President of 
the Interactive Advertising Bureau, saying “[h]aving Congress or the FTC write 
prescriptive rules around an industry that is changing every day is the surest way to inhibit 
growth”); see also Jane Yankowitz, Tragedy of the Data Commons, 25 HARV. J. L. & 
TECH. 1 (2011) (arguing that restrictions on the use of anonymized data inhibits advances 
in research). See generally James C. Cooper & Joshua D. Wright, The Missing Role of 
Economics in FTC Privacy Policy, reprinted in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF CONSUMER 
PRIVACY (Jules Polonetsky, Evan Selinger & Omer Tene, eds.) (forthcoming 2018) 
(manuscript at 20) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (arguing that 
“consumers would benefit immensely if economics were to play as central a role in privacy 
regulation as it does in antitrust”).  
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appropriate, given that privacy harms tend to be both subjective and 
heterogeneous.7 Subjective harms are not reliably measurable by 
third parties, which makes it difficult for courts to assess liabilities for 
breaches and for policy makers to determine appropriate tradeoffs 
between costs and benefits of particular data use and storage 
practices.8 Privacy harms are heterogeneous harms in the sense that 
rules regarding data use benefit those who value their privacy more 
highly but not those who attach less value to such protections. In a 
world where privacy regulations necessarily interfere with 
technological product and marketing developments, the latter group 
is not just indifferent to regulation. Rather, they are affirmatively 
harmed. The presence of substantial costs to consumers in the case of 
either too much or too little regulation suggests that a careful cost-
benefit policy analysis is essential for consumer privacy. 
Because industry advocates have so far successfully fought off 
most new federal legislative proposals, privacy advocates have turned 
to other regulatory vehicles, including state legislation,9 private class 
actions, 10  Federal Communications Commission regulation, 11  and 
 
 7. J. Howard Beales III describes the subjective nature of privacy as follows: 
Privacy is one area where such subjective preferences are important. As the FTC’s 
preliminary report noted in 2010, “for some consumers, the actual range of 
privacy-related harms is much wider and includes	.	.	. the fear of being monitored 
or simply having private information ‘out there.’” Consumers may also feel 
harmed when information is used “in a manner that is contrary to their 
expectations,” and may have “discomfort with the tracking of the online searches 
and browsing.” Some have summarized these kinds of harms as “creepiness.” 
The FTC at 100: Views from the Academic Experts: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on 
Commerce, Mfg., & Trade of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, H.R. 113th Cong. 6 
(2014) (statement of J. Howard Beales III, Professor of Strategic Mgmt. and Pub. Policy, 
George Washington Univ. Sch. of Bus.) [hereinafter statement of J. Howard Beales III] 
(first quoting FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF 
RAPID CHANGE: PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS 20 
(2010), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-
bureau-consumer-protection-preliminary-ftc-staff-report-protecting-consumer/101201privacyreport
.pdf [https://perma.cc/C2ZQ-RYNU], then quoting Adam Thierer, The Pursuit of Privacy in a 
World Where Information Control is Failing, 36 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 409, 417–21 (2013)). 
 8. See id. at 25 (arguing that consumer privacy must be accurately valued because 
firm behaviors that can interfere with privacy also create value in subsidizing technological 
improvements, facilitating better consumer decisions, and enabling better monitoring for 
credit card fraud). 
 9. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATORS, supra note 4. 
 10. See infra notes 56–65 and accompanying text. 
 11. In 2016, the FCC adopted a regulation that would require internet service 
providers to obtain the affirmative permission of consumers before selling consumer data. 
47 C.F.R. §	64 (2017). In spring 2017, the regulation was repealed. Act of Apr. 3, 2017, 
Pub. L. No. 115-22, 131 Stat. 88; see also Brian Fung, Trump Has Signed Repeal of the FCC 
Privacy Rules. Here’s What Happens Next., WASH. POST: THE SWITCH (Apr. 4, 2017), 
96 N.C. L. REV. 711 (2018) 
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Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) enforcement complaints12 to 
police consumer data uses. Class action complaints rely on state and 
federal statutes as well as common law causes of action to recover 
damages for consumer harms that result from a firm’s privacy 
practices.13 As is well known, class actions have the advantage of 
enabling a large number of consumers who have also suffered small 
damages to aggregate those claims into larger cases that make 
pursuing legal remedies much more feasible.14 The downside to class 
actions is that plaintiffs’ attorneys can use them to extract monetary 
settlements even in cases that lack merit, due to the substantial 
potential liabilities that a class action poses.15 Moreover, class action 
settlements can involve substantial legal fees for plaintiffs’ attorneys 
with relatively modest relief for consumers;16 thus, they can achieve 
deterrence, sometimes overdeterrence, without actually effectively 
compensating harms. 
In conjunction with class actions, the FTC has emerged as the 
primary federal regulator of the commercial use of consumer data 
over the past twenty years.17 During the 1990s, industry took on 
efforts to self-regulate company gathering, use, and security of 
consumer data. As part of that self-regulatory effort, firms were 
pressured into providing notice to consumers regarding what the 
company would do with consumers’ data. In fact, between 1998 and 
2001, firms underwent a dramatic shift in their use of privacy notices, 
with virtually no websites listing privacy policies in 1998 to all of the 
most popular websites displaying privacy notices by 2001.18 Along the 
way, the FTC undertook the role of augmenting companies’ self-
 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/04/04/trump-has-signed-repeal-of-
the-fcc-privacy-rules-heres-what-happens-next/?utm_term=.70257b90adcd [https://perma.cc
/C4XQ-EE27]. 
 12. For a survey of FTC enforcement actions involving privacy, see Daniel J. Solove 
& Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. 
REV. 583, 600–08 (2014). 
 13. See infra note 66 and accompanying text. 
 14. 1 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS §	1:3, at 7, 9 (5th ed. 
2011). 
 15. See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298–99 (7th Cir. 1995) 
(discussing the “intense pressure to settle” that people who are involved in class actions 
face). 
 16. See Deborah R. Hensler & Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Beyond “It Just Ain’t Worth It”: 
Alternative Strategies for Damage Class Action Reform, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 137, 
138–39, 148–49 (2001) (discussing examples derived from RAND Corporation study of 
class action settlements). 
 17. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 12, at 590–606. 
 18. Allyson W. Haynes, Online Privacy Policies: Contracting Away Control Over 
Personal Information?, 111 PA. ST. L. REV. 587, 593 (2007). 
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regulation by enforcing representations and promises that firms make 
to consumers in their privacy policies.19 In particular, section 5 of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTC Act”) gives the FTC authority 
to prohibit unfair or deceptive acts or practices,20 and the FTC 
deemed it deceptive for a company to fail to abide by its own privacy 
policy representations.21 Over time, the FTC has gradually moved 
toward using its section 5 authority beyond merely enforcing the 
details of the privacy policies in an effort to ensure that firms’ privacy 
efforts comport with industry norms and consumer expectations.22 
The FTC has extremely limited ability to unilaterally impose 
monetary liability on firms,23 but through its authority to “prohibit” 
unfair or deceptive practices, it can engage in “command-and-
control” regulation.24  Firms fearful of the consequences of FTC 
enforcement typically respond to enforcement actions against them 
by entering into settlement agreements with the agency under which 
the firm agrees to comply with a set of expectations that the FTC 
might or might not have formal authority to impose.25 Included in 
many settlements is an agreement that the firm will refrain from 
certain business practices for a number of years, during which time 
the firm agrees to FTC or other external monitoring of its activities.26 
FTC enforcement actions are thus similar to class actions in that they 
can induce settlement agreements that are not clearly rooted in 
governing legal principles, and the two mechanisms together 
contribute to a significant lack of clarity regarding the obligations of 
similarly situated firms.27 
 
 19. Id. at 599. 
 20. Federal Trade Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 63-203, ch. 311 §	5, 38 Stat. 717, 719 
(1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §	45(a)(1) (2012)). 
 21. Haynes, supra note 18, at 599. 
 22. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 12, at 661. 
 23. Id. at 661 & n.59. 
 24. “Command-and-control” regulation occurs when a government entity mandates 
or forbids action rather than providing economic incentives to move regulated entities into 
more desirable activities. For a discussion of the tradeoff, see Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. 
Posner, Toward a Pigouvian State, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 93, 95, 99 (2015).  
 25. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 12, at 610–19 (discussing the prevalence of FTC 
settlements and common attributes of FTC settlement orders). 
 26. See id.; see also Cooper & Wright, supra note 6 (discussing commonality of 
lengthy monitoring or cease and desist periods). 
 27. On the lack of clarity regarding FTC guiding policy, see Michael D. Scott, The 
FTC, the Unfairness Doctrine, and Data Security Breach Litigation: Has the Commission 
Gone Too Far?, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 127, 183 (2008); Gerard M. Stegmaier & Wendell 
Bartnick, Psychics, Russian Roulette, and Data Security: The FTC’s Hidden Data-Security 
Requirements, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 673, 676 (2013). 
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Moreover, each of these methods of addressing consumer data 
use and protection is imperfect, in that they can lead to too much or 
too little effective regulation. In particular, the subjective and 
heterogeneous nature of harm to consumers makes it highly unlikely 
that the FTC, lawyer advocates, or courts will accurately assess the 
value of consumer privacy. What is needed is a mechanism designed 
to elicit information about the value that consumers place on privacy, 
which would solve the subjectivity problem, as well as specific 
information about individual consumer valuation, which would solve 
the heterogeneity problem. 
Markets utilize pricing mechanisms and thus can treat the 
problem of valuing consumer privacy relatively effectively in many 
contexts. Indeed, U.S. companies are beginning to use such price 
mechanisms in the privacy-relevant marketing of their goods and 
services. Grocery and drug store chains have instituted loyalty 
programs, under which consumers who are comfortable sharing their 
purchasing information for purposes of targeted advertising and 
otherwise pay lower prices for many items than customers who do not 
participate in the data-sharing programs.28 In addition, in 2015 AT&T 
began to offer its GigaPower U-Verse fiber-optic internet access 
service in Kansas City for two different prices: a higher price for 
customers who do not want their online browsing tracked for 
purposes of company-generated targeted advertising and a lower 
price for customers whose browsing will be tracked.29 In addition, 
many companies that are sensitive to consumer concerns about 
privacy offer products that leave many sharing decisions to the 
consumers.30 
However, what happens when privacy decisions are not or should 
not be left to the marketplace? In some cases, price discrimination or 
filtering is not feasible for the company. In others, technological or 
other market changes place pressure on the company to scale back on 
 
 28. Martin H. Bosworth, Loyalty Cards: Reward or Threat?, CONSUMER AFF. (July 
11, 2005), https://www.consumeraffairs.com/news04/2005/loyalty_cards.html 
[https://perma.cc/5LAY-LWGC]. 
 29. Elizabeth Dwoskin & Thomas Gryta, AT&T Offers Data Privacy—for a Price, 
WALL ST. J.: DIGITS (Feb. 18, 2015, 6:01 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2015/02/18/att-
offers-data-privacy-for-a-price/ [https://perma.cc/UUT8-7BNV (dark archive)]. AT&T 
stopped this price discrimination in 2016. Sean Buckley, AT&T Stops Tracking Internet 
Activity of GigaPower Customers, FIERCETELECOM (Sept. 30, 2016, 10:22 AM), 
http://www.fiercetelecom.com/telecom/at-t-to-sunset-internet-activity-tracking-requirement
-for-gigapower-customers [https://perma.cc/A558-MPZU]. 
 30. For example, laptops, smart watches, mobile websites, and other products now 
commonly contain privacy setting menus. See Brian X. Chen, How to Protect Your Private 
Data From Prying Apps, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2017, at B6. 
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prior promises regarding privacy protections, causing potential 
difficulties for long-term contracts. Separately, sometimes other 
policy considerations, such as fairness or distrust for consumer 
choices, should trump these private market decisions.31 Although no 
ex post regulatory mechanism can perfectly treat the problems of 
subjectivity and heterogeneity, this Article conducts a thought 
experiment into whether a different regulatory policy tool could be 
more effective than those currently used to treat privacy violations. In 
particular, this Article explores the possibility of an alternative, 
informal dispute resolution mechanism that carries the promise of 
eliciting at least rough information about how consumers value their 
privacy. Specifically, might the use of an arbitral mechanism, one 
jointly consented to by a company and FTC, be preferable to both 
FTC action and private class actions? 
Arbitration can at least roughly filter out consumers who place a 
low value on their privacy because individuals who feel harmed by 
company actions must file claims to get relief, which will likely entail 
a cost that low-value consumers would not incur. As long as the 
financial costs to consumers are kept low or negligible, then 
consumers who do experience harm should not be discouraged from 
coming forward, and, assuming that compensation levels reasonably 
compensate high-privacy-value plaintiffs for their harms, the resulting 
liabilities can more closely resemble the social value of privacy to a 
firm’s customers. These liabilities can be superior to FTC direct 
enforcement, which lacks reliable valuation mechanisms. In theory, 
these liabilities can also be superior to class actions, which could 
incorporate valuation mechanisms into the claims process, but not in 
an incentive-compatible manner, at least according to the federal 
courts that have considered the matter.32 With FTC oversight, the 
incentive difficulties could be more reliably managed. And with 
voluntary participation by firms, companies could be protected from 
being strong-armed into a liability scheme that leaves them worse off. 
Although an arbitration mechanism might cause firms to 
internalize privacy harms more effectively because only a portion of 
customers would step forward to file and prosecute claims, the 
resulting claim filing might not accurately sort high- and low-privacy-
value customers. A customer angry with the improper use, sharing, or 
exposure of her data might be more inclined to file a claim for relief 
 
 31. See FTC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 71 F. Supp. 3d 1158, 1159–60 (W.D. Wash. 2014) 
(denying Amazon’s summary judgment request regarding billing consumers for 
unauthorized in-app charges incurred by children). 
 32. See infra notes 62–63 and accompanying text. 
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while those less concerned about privacy may be less inclined to file a 
claim. On the other hand, it is also conceivable that some customers 
who place a high value on their privacy will not bring claims because 
the opportunity costs of filing the claim are too high or the remedy 
available too small, while some low-value customers will step forward 
with claims because their opportunity costs are low and the remedy 
sufficiently large. Unless one feels comfortable concluding that the 
high-income, fully employed people in society tend to place a low 
value on privacy while the lower income and underemployed people 
place a high value on privacy, the “pricing” mechanism generated 
with arbitration will create a mismatch. If the point of the pricing is 
merely to force a company to correctly internalize the costs of privacy 
violations, this mismatch would not matter if the number of inert 
high-value claimants is about equivalent to the number of active low-
value claimants. Without a reliable pricing mechanism, however, 
there is no way of knowing consumers’ valuations. Indeed, odds are 
that the mix is not accurate. One could counter that the partial 
compensation is at least better than either no company liability or full 
liability for all customers, but without a confident sense of how far off 
the mark the arbitration scheme is, it does not necessarily represent a 
policy improvement. 
Fortunately, there is a technique that could improve the sorting 
mechanism for claims in arbitration. In particular, if a private market 
in plaintiffs’ claims insurance were permitted, even encouraged by the 
FTC, then customers who place a high value on privacy could ensure 
a right to be compensated for violations through the purchase of ex 
ante (pre-violation) insurance. Specifically, the insurer, for a premium 
fee, could agree to represent plaintiffs in the event that they suffer a 
compensable privacy violation. As part of its offered services, the 
insurer might also act as a privacy violation monitor. Only those 
customers who place a high value on privacy would likely purchase 
such insurance because the premiums would represent a certain 
financial outlay in return for only a probabilistic future payout. When 
the insurer also acts as market watchdog, the premium paid by the 
consumer could also be viewed as a type of donation to a privacy 
advocate seeking to hold companies accountable. In either case, 
customers who place a low value on privacy would not be expected to 
participate. Third-party insurers should be permitted to bring 
aggregated claims representing those customers who paid premiums 
prior to the discovery of a privacy violation. Otherwise, aggregated 
claims should not be permitted in arbitration. If the costs of the 
privacy violation are small, individual arbitral claims might not be 
96 N.C. L. REV. 711 (2018) 
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feasible. And, if the harm to a privacy violation is large, then 
individual claims would be encouraged, further adding to ex ante 
deterrence. 
Part I briefly describes the current FTC enforcement and class 
action mechanisms. It explains why each mechanism can individually 
lead to either too much or too little consumer data protections and 
points out that the concurrent use of the two mechanisms enhances 
the likelihood of too much data protections. Part II introduces the 
alternative arbitration enforcement mechanism and demonstrates 
why, if carefully constructed, it could produce more efficient 
incentives for companies. Part II also explores a number of 
complications and potential objections and concludes that none is 
strong enough to preclude experimentation of the arbitral 
enforcement mechanism, subject to the potential development of a 
third-party claims insurance mechanism.  
I.  FTC ORDERS, CLASS ACTIONS, AND THEIR LIMITATIONS 
A. FTC Enforcement Actions 
Under section 5 of the FTC Act, the agency is empowered to 
bring enforcement actions against firms that engage in deceptive or 
unfair business practices.33 According to the FTC, a firm’s action is 
deemed deceptive if it engages in “a representation, omission or 
practice that is likely to mislead the consumer acting reasonably in the 
circumstances, to the consumer’s detriment.”34 In the context of 
consumer data privacy, a firm’s actions are deemed deceptive if the 
company fails to comply with its own privacy policies, if it fails to take 
the data security efforts that it represents it takes, or if it fails to 
clearly disclose material information about the manner in which it will 
gather, use, and/or store consumer data.35 In addition, a firm’s actions 
can be deemed deceptive if its privacy notice is buried in documents 
where consumers are unlikely to find the notice,36 if it fails to fully 
disclose the gathering and use of consumer information,37 or if it fails 
 
 33. Federal Trade Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 63-203, ch. 311 §	5, 38 Stat. 717, 719 
(1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §	45(a)(1) (2012)). 
 34. Letter from James C. Miller III, Chairman, FTC, to Hon. John D. Dingell, Comm. 
Chairman on Energy and Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives, at 176 (Oct. 14, 
1983), reprinted in Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 174–84 (1984). 
 35. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 12, at 628–30 (describing “broken promise” cases). 
 36. See id. at 658, 671–72. 
 37. See, e.g., Decision and Order at 3–4, Sears Holdings Mgmt. Corp., File No. 
0823099, Dkt. No. C-4264, (F.T.C. Aug. 31, 2009), 2009 WL 2979770, at *3–4.	
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to disclose the consequences of consumer behaviors.38 Finally, a firm’s 
privacy notices can be deemed deceptive if they contain overly vague 
statements or promises that fail to properly inform customers of the 
risks to their privacy.39 
A firm’s actions can be deemed unfair if they fail to comport with 
sound business practices in a manner that harms consumers.40 FTC 
authority here is limited to prohibiting any trade practice that “causes 
or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not 
reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not outweighed 
by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.” 41 
Moreover, the FTC has stated that it will not use this authority to 
focus on trivial, speculative, emotional, or other subjective harms.42 
Trade practices can be deemed unfair if they fail to disclose or 
provide information that better enables consumers to make 
meaningful choices among products or services. And, once a firm has 
put in place a data privacy policy, it is deemed unfair for that firm to 
unilaterally impose a retroactive change to that policy that erodes 
consumers’ ability to rely on maintaining their privacy.43 Moreover, 
firms are prohibited from using unfair product designs or software 
settings, by, for example, making installed software nonremovable 
from the customer’s computer. 44  Finally, firms that fail to take 
reasonable and appropriate measures to secure personal information 
can be deemed to have committed an unfair trade practice regardless 
of the promises they make to their customers.45 
 
 38. See, e.g., Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief at 25, 
FTC v. Frostwire, LLC, No. 1:11-cv-23643 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 7, 2011). 
 39. See, e.g., Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief at 3–4, 
FTC v. Echometrix, Inc., No. 2:10-cv-05516-DRH-ARL (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2010). 
 40. See Letter from F.T.C. Chairman & Comm’rs to Hon. John C. Danforth, Member, 
Consumer Subcomm., Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Hon. Wendell H. Ford, Chairman, 
Consumer Subcomm., Comm. on Commerce, Sci., at 1073–74 (Dec. 17, 1980), reprinted in 
Int’l Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949, 1070–76 (1984). 
 41. 15 U.S.C. §	45(n) (2012). 
 42. Letter from FTC Comm’rs to Wendell H. Ford & John C. Danforth, supra note 
40, at 1073 (“Emotional impact and other more subjective types of harm .	.	. will not 
ordinarily make a practice unfair. Thus, for example, the Commission will not seek to ban 
an advertisement merely because it offends the tastes or social beliefs of some 
viewers.	.	.	.”). 
 43. See Gateway Learning Corp., 138 F.T.C. 443, 467–73–50, 2004 WL 5662254, at *5–
8 (2004) (determining that it is unfair for a firm to retroactively change its privacy 
practices as applied to previously collected consumer data). 
 44. Decision and Order at 2–4, Sony BMG Music Entm’t, File No. 0623019, Dkt. No. 
C-4195 (F.T.C. June 28, 2007), 2007 WL 1942983, at *5–6. 
 45. Complaint for Civil Penalties, Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief at 8, United 
States v. Rental Res. Servs., Inc., No. 0:09-cv-00524-PJS-JJK (D. Minn. Mar. 5, 2009); 
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If, after a non-public investigation, the FTC concludes that a 
practice is deceptive or unfair, the FTC is authorized to obtain cease-
and-desist orders, to require that companies take affirmative remedial 
actions, and to monitor future activities.46 Specifically, the FTC issues 
a proposed complaint containing a description of the alleged violation 
and an order including the proposed remedy.47 At that point the 
company has an opportunity to offer to settle the charges with the 
proposed order made available for public comment.48 At the end of 
the comment period, the FTC can issue a final order.49 Firms have 
substantial incentives to settle rather than challenge the complaint 
and order, because settlement avoids an expensive and public legal 
battle and does not require that the firm admit wrongdoing. Of the 
approximately 200 privacy-related complaints issued against 
companies to date, apparently only three failed to reach resolution in 
the form of a settlement.50 In fact, since virtually all firms enter into 
settlements with the FTC, there are essentially no judicial precedents 
regarding the FTC’s authority and development of de facto privacy 
policies.51 
Although FTC authority is indeed significant, the FTC is not 
generally authorized to issue fines or monetary sanctions to firms 
engaging in unfair or deceptive trade practices.52 In a sense, then, its 
authority consists of creating consumer property rules, or rules that 
create the right to injunction, rather than liability rules, which only 
require that a party pay for the damage caused by its actions.53 In 
creating property rules, FTC orders tend to direct companies to 
undertake a line of behavior that affects all of its consumers, 
 
Stipulated Final Judgment and Order for Civil Penalties, Permanent Injunction, and Other 
Equitable Relief at 6, Rental Res. Servs. Inc., No. 0:09-cv-00524-PJS-JJK. 
 46. On the process, see generally A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s 
Investigative and Law Enforcement Authority, FED. TRADE COMM’N (July 2008), 
http://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do/enforcement-authority [https://perma.cc/556H-4YC2]. 
 47. 15 U.S.C. §	45(b) (2012); 2 AM. BAR ASS’N, SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, THE 
FTC AS AN ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AGENCY: ITS STRUCTURE, POWERS AND 
PROCEDURES 39–40 (1981). 
 48. AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 47, at 39–40. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 12, at 610–11. 
 51. Id. at 606. 
 52. The federal courts accept the FTC’s assertion of authority to seek equitable 
monetary relief for restitution or rescission under Section	13(b) of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act, but typically privacy violations do not include monetary liability. Id. at 
611–12, 612 n.124; 15 U.S.C. §	53 (2012). 
 53. This important distinction originated in 1972. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas 
Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 
HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1106–10 (1972). 
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regardless of how individual consumers value data privacy. In 
creating these property rules, the FTC can also forbid the company 
from bargaining around the property right through a consumer 
contract. Instead, the regulation is more “command and control” in 
nature. 
One potential problem with FTC orders is that the subsequent 
company conduct will tend to apply to all of its customers, despite 
significant empirical evidence that many people place a relatively low 
value on privacy.54 When deciding to bring an enforcement action, the 
FTC might assume that all consumers will benefit from its 
enforcement actions, thereby drastically overestimating the 
proportion of consumers who would be benefitted.55 This risk comes 
from the fact that consumers who are unhappy will file complaints, 
either on their own behalf or through consumer advocacy groups, 
whereas consumers who place a lower value on privacy will remain 
inert. If FTC regulatory actions overvalue privacy, those actions 
increase the cost of firms’ business operations, which would have the 
effect of inefficiently raising prices for all of the company’s products, 
services, and innovations, potentially eliminating some from the 
marketplace.56 
Just as the FTC can take actions that overprotect privacy, it can 
also end up refraining from acting in ways that undervalue privacy. 
Because consumer harms are both subjective (hard to value 
monetarily by others) and heterogeneous (the value of privacy varies 
across consumers), the FTC might choose not to pursue enforcement 
actions out of a lack of demonstrated harm. Recall that significant 
nonsubjective harm to consumers is typically a prerequisite to FTC 
action on grounds of unfairness, and where harms are nonmonetary 
and diversely experienced, the agency could inefficiently choose not 
to seek to enjoin firm activities under either prong of its authority. 
 
 54. For a review of the empirical literature see Alessandro Acquisti, Curtis Taylor, & 
Liad Wagman, The Economics of Privacy, J. ECON. LITERATURE 442, 462–78 (2016). 
 55. Recall from the introduction that consumers with low privacy values are 
affirmatively harmed when FTC regulation forbids the use of technologies that aid those 
customers. 
 56. See, e.g., Apple, Inc., F.T.C. File No. 1123108, at 5 (Jan. 15, 2014), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/140115applestatementwright_0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/M446-D4M9] (dissenting statement of Commissioner Joshua D. Wright) 
(“[P]lacing Apple under a twenty-year order in a marketplace in which consumer 
preferences and technology are rapidly changing is very likely to do more to harm 
consumers than it is to protect them.”); Testimony of J. Howard Beales III, supra note 7, 
at 17 (“Regulation or enforcement that is too stringent may reduce the risk of the 
particular privacy harms to which it is addressed, but it increases the risk of precluding 
innovations that would make everyone’s life better.”). 
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Even assuming that the FTC could accurately gauge the aggregate 
harm to consumers (i.e., it knows how to value both high- and low-
privacy-value consumers), it will not know the relevant fraction of 
high- and low-value consumers, a necessary assessment to 
determining whether enforcement action is ultimately warranted. 
Even if the FTC could reasonably assess consumer value, the 
cost-benefit calculus requires an assessment of the regulatory costs, 
which turns in part on forgone products and services, including future 
innovations, facts that the FTC cannot know. This extra information 
load on the government stems from the blunt property rights tool 
afforded it. If the FTC could instead simply require firms to pay for 
the privacy harms caused by their business practices, then the firm 
could itself determine whether it makes good business sense to 
continue its practices despite the potential for harms caused to a 
portion of consumers. With property rules, FTC decisions can 
unnecessarily harm either innovation-minded or privacy-minded 
consumers. 
In theory, then, when (1) harms are subjective and 
heterogeneous, and (2) FTC actions constitute the only form of 
consumer protection (a counterfactual), then FTC enforcement can 
lead to (a) overregulation—because the FTC incorrectly overassesses 
the number of consumers who suffer significant harms when it acts; or 
(b) underregulation—because subjective and heterogeneous harms 
can cause the FTC to refrain from acting despite significant injury to 
consumer privacy. The difficulty is further exacerbated by the fact 
that even if the FTC accurately gauges aggregate harm, the property-
rule solution fails to enable an efficient regulatory mechanism under 
which firms internalize the costs of their practices for future business 
decisions. 
B. Class Actions 
Sitting alongside many possible FTC enforcement actions are 
private lawsuits alleging state common law and statutory causes of 
action.57 Individual privacy harms are typically not large enough to 
justify the costs of bringing individual lawsuits, but plaintiffs’ lawyers 
can aggregate claims through class action lawsuits. 58  Although 
plaintiffs can and sometimes do request court orders and injunctive 
 
 57. See, e.g., Low v. LinkedIn Corp., 900 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1016 (N.D. Cal. 2012) 
(alleging breach of contract, invasion of privacy, conversion, unjust enrichment, 
negligence, and state statutory claims); Claridge v. RockYou, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 2d 855, 859 
(N.D. Cal. 2011) (alleging contract, tort, and state statutory claims). 
 58. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
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relief, often the primary remedy pursued and granted is monetary 
relief.59 The class action can thus act as a liability regime, and 
therefore it carries the promise of offering firms the flexibility of 
determining for themselves whether business practices should 
continue. 
Despite this promise, the class action also fails to produce 
efficient results. To the extent that settlement is the norm because 
firms fear their outside exposure and wish to eliminate negative 
publicity, plaintiffs’ attorneys will bring too many lawsuits, causing 
overdeterrence. 60  The potential overdeterrence problem is 
exacerbated if every plaintiff in the class is deemed entitled to the 
damages amount that reflects harm to high-privacy-value customers. 
Often, however, defendants seek preliminary termination 
through certification fights, summary judgment motions, or other 
means, prior to agreeing to settle class claims. For example, a 
defendant could seek a determination that plaintiffs’ privacy harms 
are not recoverable because, as subjective harms, they are too 
speculative. Such an argument might be deemed premature prior to 
trial61 or inapt if state statutes specify statutory damages. Several 
courts, however, have dismissed contract claims on grounds that the 
privacy harms are too speculative.62 To the extent that courts are able 
and willing to eliminate the possibility of plaintiff recovery, class 
actions could provide too little deterrence. 
Part II offers arbitration as a mechanism for sorting high- and 
low-value consumers in a liability regime. Class actions also could 
serve this function. Specifically, if a defendant is liable only to the 
extent that individual plaintiffs collect their promised awards (a 
“claims-made” approach), then the need to come forward, fill out 
 
 59. See How Do Consumer Class Action Lawsuits Work?, OHIO STATE BAR ASS’N 
(June 24, 2016), https://www.ohiobar.org/ForPublic/Resources/LawYouCanUse/Pages
/LawYouCanUse-358.aspx [https://perma.cc/ZV45-E33L]. 
 60. See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298–99 (7th Cir. 1995) 
(arguing that class actions lead to “blackmail settlements” because defendants “fear	.	.	. 
the risk of bankruptcy [and] settle even if they have no legal liability,” rather than “stake 
their companies on the outcome of a single jury trial”). 
 61. See Claridge, 785 F. Supp. 2d at 861. 
 62. See, e.g., Low, 900 F. Supp. 2d at 1028–29 (holding that disclosure of personally 
identifying browsing histories did not cause damages cognizable under contract law); 
Cherny v. Emigrant Bank, 604 F. Supp. 2d 605, 608–09 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (holding that 
alleged disclosure of a customer email address and consequent receipt of unwanted spam 
emails did not create recoverable harms). But see In re Facebook Privacy Litig., 572 F. 
App’x. 494, 494 (9th Cir. 2014) (mem.) (reversing the district court’s determination that 
the sharing of personally identifiable information with advertisers did not create 
recoverable harm). 
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paperwork, show receipts, etc., can be a mechanism for sorting high- 
and low-value claims even where a single damages amount is assessed 
across all plaintiffs. Federal judges are hostile to claims-made 
arrangements, however, because the schemes create problematic 
incentives.63 Once the defendant bargains for claims-made liability, 
the plaintiffs’ attorneys bargain for an assessment of attorneys’ fees 
based on the total amount available for recovery rather than the 
actual amounts recovered because of the delay in determining how 
much is actually recovered. 64  Under those circumstances neither 
defendants’ nor plaintiffs’ attorneys have any incentive to encourage 
plaintiffs to come forward to receive their awards. In addition, 
plaintiffs’ attorneys sometimes worry that claims-made liabilities will 
result in the defendant paying too little in damages,65 and, in any 
event, it ensures that the defendant has no incentive to help 
communicate with plaintiffs to increase the likelihood of 
compensation. To resolve these problems, the lawyers will typically 
negotiate for a fixed liability pot, with any unclaimed amounts going 
to a charity or organization formed to combat the type of problem at 
issue in the lawsuit.66 Under these circumstances, high- and low-value 
consumers can be sorted, but the sorting does not affect the firm’s 
ultimate liability, meaning that the prospect of overdeterrence 
continues. 
 
 63. See, e.g., Stewart v. USA Tank Sales & Erection Co., No. 12-05136-CV-SW-DGK, 
2014 WL 836212, at *6–9 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 4, 2014) (encouraging “the parties to confer on 
an alternate settlement proposal that addresses the Court’s concerns”); Childs v. United 
Life Ins. Co., No. 10-CV-23-PJC, 2012 WL 1857163, at *4–5 (N.D. Okla. May 21, 2012) 
(“[U]nder the circumstances presented here and the flaws in the original notice, the Court 
finds that additional notice must be given.”); Ferrington v. McAfee, Inc., No. 10-CV-
01455-LHK, 2012 WL 1156399, at *8–10 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2012) (“This certainly suggests 
that .	.	. extinguishing the .	.	. class’s claims for no consideration would be unfair and 
unreasonable.”). 
 64. Relatedly, some assert that plaintiffs’ attorneys sometimes collude with 
defendants so that defendants incur low liabilities (with reversionary settlements), 
plaintiffs’ attorneys reap large fees (through clear sailing agreements), and plaintiffs end 
up with little or nothing. William D. Henderson, Clear Sailing Agreements: A Special Form 
of Collusion in Class Action Settlements, 77 TUL. L. REV. 813, 825–28 (2003). 
 65. This is particularly likely when plaintiffs suffer small damages, which is common 
for privacy harms. When plaintiffs suffer small damages, most will decide that it is not 
worth the effort and expense of claiming the award. Martin H. Redish, Peter Julian & 
Samantha Zyontz, Cy Pres Relief and the Pathologies of the Modern Class Action: A 
Normative and Empirical Analysis, 62 FLA. L. REV. 617, 618–19 (2010). 
 66. Id. at 634. 
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C.  The Concurrence of FTC Enforcement and Class Actions 
Firms are subject to both FTC enforcement and class action 
lawsuits. The possibility of a class action can alleviate the potential 
underdeterrence that can result when the FTC chooses not to bring 
an enforcement action, and, conversely, the FTC enforcement option 
can alleviate the potential underdeterrence that could result from an 
unsuccessful class action. Thus, the concurrence of these two 
mechanisms should shrink the underdeterrence problems that either 
mechanism alone faces. However, the concurrence of the two actions 
carries the potential of magnifying the overdeterrence problem that 
can exist under either mechanism. For example, settling with the FTC 
could add fuel to the fire of a class action lawsuit, on the grounds that 
harmed consumers should be compensated because the firm agreed to 
stop its trade practice. Indeed, when the variety of state, federal, and 
international enforcement tools are cumulated, overdeterrence 
becomes increasingly likely. 
II.  FTC-MONITORED ARBITRATION AS A POTENTIAL SOLUTION 
This Part explores whether arbitration, coupled with claims 
insurance, could improve the regulation of consumer privacy. Recall 
that FTC enforcement orders or class actions can lead to either 
underdeterrence or overdeterrence, and the accumulation of 
enforcement actions can increase potential overdeterrence.67 Section 
II.A briefly describes private arbitration and its recent use to replace 
consumer class actions, and it explores whether arbitration could help 
calibrate firm incentives to protect privacy. Section II.B discusses the 
importance of FTC oversight and briefly describes the FTC’s prior 
mixed success with arbitration. Section II.C identifies claims 
insurance as a mechanism for mitigating a problem inherent in the 
arbitration scheme. Finally, Section II.D addresses a number of 
potential objections and complications associated with this alternative 
mechanism. 
A. Arbitrating Privacy Harms 
The problem of calibrating deterrence of privacy harms can be 
mitigated with enforcement schemes designed to better incorporate 
pricing mechanisms into firms’ liabilities. The federal government 
could experiment with arbitration, where appropriate, as a 
mechanism likely to more efficiently channel consumer data use. 
 
 67. See supra Part I. 
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Arbitration typically entails private dispute resolution.68 When 
parties agree to binding arbitration, they usually forfeit their rights to 
bring their claims to court.69 Instead, they jointly agree to hire a third 
party to resolve them,70 and they often choose the arbitration rules to 
be applied to their dispute. 71  Federal law and Supreme Court 
precedent both support this private form of dispute resolution.72 
Private arbitration is a creature of contract, and it is therefore a 
heterogeneous beast. Most parties anticipate that arbitration will 
reduce the costs of litigation73 with reduced discovery,74 informal 
hearing procedures,75 and the use of expert arbitrators rather than 
generalist judges.76 Moreover, arbitration allows claimants their “day 
in court” in the sense that parties’ cases are not thrown out on 
pleading technicalities, and summary proceedings are unusual. 77 
 
 68. CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHOZAL, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: CASES AND 
PROBLEMS 1 (3d ed. 2013). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. For an empirical examination of choice of arbitration rules in the arbitration 
provisions of CEO employment contracts, see Erin O’Hara O’Connor, Kenneth J. Martin 
& Randall S. Thomas, Customizing Employment Arbitration, 98 IOWA L. REV. 133, 163–
64 (2012) (finding that of 469 clauses studied, all but eighteen either articulated the 
governing procedures or chose pre-existing set of procedural rules to govern in 
arbitration) or Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, “Volunteering” to Arbitrate 
Through Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer’s Experience, LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. Winter/Spring 2004, at 55, 66–69. 
 72. See Federal Arbitration Act, ch. 392, 61 Stat. 669, 670–71 (1947) (codified as 
amended at 9 U.S.C. §§	1–7 (2012)); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10–16 (1984) 
(concluding that policy favoring enforcement of arbitration clauses requires that the 
Federal Arbitration Act be interpreted to apply in state courts). 
 73. See Richard W. Naimark & Stephanie E. Keer, International Private Commercial 
Arbitration: Expectations and Perceptions of Attorneys and Business People: A Forced-
Rank Analysis, 30 INT’L BUS. LAW. 203, 203–09 (2002) reprinted in, TOWARDS A SCIENCE 
OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: COLLECTED EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 43, 45, 49 
(Christopher R. Drahozal & Richard W. Mainmark eds., 2005) (surveying the perceptions 
and expectations of attorneys and their clients in commercial international arbitration). 
 74. 3 IAN R. MACNEIL, RICHARD E. SPEIDEL & THOMAS J. STIPANOWICH, 
FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW: AGREEMENTS, AWARDS, AND REMEDIES UNDER THE 
FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT § 34.1 (1994 & Supp. 1999) (“Limitations on discovery .	.	. 
remain one of the hallmarks of American commercial arbitration .	.	.	. Avoidance of the 
delay and expense associated with discovery is still one of the reasons parties choose to 
arbitrate.” (citing William L.D. Barrett, Arbitration of a Complex Commercial Case: 
Practical Guidelines for Arbitrators and Counsel, 41 ARB. J. 15, 19 (1986))). 
 75. Christopher R. Drahozal, Why Arbitrate? Substantive Versus Procedural Theories 
of Private Judging, 22 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 163, 173 (2011). 
 76. Id. at 174–75. 
 77. See Mitchell L. Marinello, Protecting the Natural Cost Advantages of Arbitration, 
AM. BAR ASS’N (2008), https://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/litigationnews/practice
_areas/corporate_naturalcost.html [https://perma.cc/JA2S-UBC6] (“Careful arbitrators 
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Finally, for small value claims, some arbitral associations have 
promulgated expedited procedures that enable claimants to prosecute 
their claims without incurring the time and expense of meeting in 
person.78 Courts have obligations to enforce both private arbitration 
agreements and awards under international convention as well as 
federal and state law79 with limited exceptions.80 
The arbitration explored here is slightly different from that 
contemplated under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). A 
contractual obligation between the consumer and the company to 
arbitrate their disputes is generally enforceable under the FAA,81 but 
under current law, that contractual arrangement would not eliminate 
the FTC’s authority to bring its own enforcement action.82 Moreover, 
the contractual obligation would require the consent of the consumer. 
The arbitration explored here would replace both private actions and 
FTC enforcement orders, and it posits a voluntary arrangement made 
between the firm and the FTC rather than between the firm and the 
consumer. Despite a lack of consumer consent, an agreement 
between the firm and the FTC that binds consumers might better 
protect consumer interests. The FTC is better able to insist on 
consumer-friendly arbitral attributes than the typical consumer, who 
does not even read let alone understand the implications of the 
arbitration agreement,83 and who typically is presented the arbitration 
 
are wary of motions to dismiss or for summary judgment and often will discourage or even 
forbid them.”). 
 78. See, e.g., AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND 
MEDIATION PROCEDURES INCLUDING PROCEDURES FOR LARGE, COMPLEX 
COMMERCIAL DISPUTES 35 (2017), https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/commercial
_rules.pdf [https://perma.cc/5Z9D-469Y] (“Where no party’s claim exceeds $25,000 .	.	. the 
dispute shall be resolved by submission of documents, unless any party requests an oral 
hearing, or the arbitrator determines that an oral hearing is necessary.”). Conversely, 
although typically not present in consumer disputes, some parties choose much more 
formalized arbitration mechanisms with highly-trained arbitrators; these parties (as well as 
others) tend to choose arbitration to obtain a neutral decision maker. Drahozal, supra 
note 75, at 174–75. 
 79. 9 U.S.C. §	201 (2012); Unif. Arbitration Act, §§	6–7, 7 U.L.A. 25–32 (2009); see 
also Arbitration Act, UNIF. LAW COMM’N, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title
=Arbitration%20Act%20(2000) [https://perma.cc/WRY9-8SU3] (showing states which 
have adopted the 2000 Uniform Arbitration Act). 
 80. 9 U.S.C. §§	1, 10, 11. 
 81. Southland Corp., v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 7, 10–11 (1984). 
 82. Cf. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 27–29 (1991) (noting 
that the EEOC could still prosecute employee’s claim notwithstanding clause requiring 
that the employee bring claims in arbitration). 
 83. See Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 
HARV. L. REV. 1174, 1179 (1983); Amy J. Schmitz, Consideration of “Contracting Culture 
in Enforcing Arbitration Provisions, 81 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 123, 166 (2007) 
(“[C]orporations usually draft these form [arbitration] provisions knowing that consumers 
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agreement on take-it-or-leave-it terms.84 Moreover, the arbitration 
explored here would be subject to FTC oversight and monitoring, 
which should provide further consumer protections. Admittedly, 
however, the scheme proposed here does not leave the arbitration 
choice to the consumer, and thus it potentially interferes with 
consumer autonomy. Because the arbitral mechanism discussed here 
would bind non-contractual parties as well as government 
enforcement agencies, it does not fall within current statutory 
schemes for the enforcement of arbitration agreements. Thus, 
Congressional legislation likely would be needed to implement this 
scheme, a complication that is discussed further in the next Part. 
Consumer arbitration is common in the United States, but it 
remains controversial, 85  and it is not supported in some other 
countries.86 Courts scrutinize arbitration clauses to make sure that 
they are not unconscionable,87 but so long as the arbitration clauses 
are found in valid contracts and do not contemplate unfair 
procedures, they will be enforced. 88  One reason that consumer 
arbitration is controversial in the U.S. is that firms can use it to 
circumvent potential class action liability.89 As a result, in May 2016, 
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) proposed a 
rule that would prohibit certain consumer financial product and 
service providers from using a pre-dispute arbitration agreement that 
 
generally do not read or understand these provisions.”); Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping 
Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631, 1648 (2005) (“Empirical studies 
have shown that only a minute percentage of consumers read form agreements, and of 
these, only a smaller number understand what they read.” (citing Alan M. White & Cathy 
Lesser Mansfield, Literacy and Contract, 13 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 233 (2002))). 
 84. See David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee 
and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 53–56 
(1997). 
 85. See STEVEN C. BENNETT, ARBITRATION: ESSENTIAL CONCEPTS 161–66 (2002) 
(discussing this controversy); Jean R. Sternlight, Consumer Arbitration, in ARBITRATION 
LAW IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 127, 128–30, 140–51 (2006)). 
 86. Sternlight, supra note 85, at 139–40. 
 87. DRAHOZAL, supra note 68, at 129–36. With FTC oversight of this arbitration, 
court review might be unnecessary. 
 88. See David Horton, The Shadow Terms: Contract Procedure and Unilateral 
Amendments, 57 UCLA L. REV. 605, 622 (2010) (“By 1991	.	.	. the Court had left open just 
two avenues to contest arbitration clauses. First, a plaintiff could, theoretically, show that 
the lack of judicial forum would thwart her ability to vindicate statutory rights—though 
the Court had made clear that this would require forceful, specific proof. Second, 
arbitration clauses remained susceptible to the same defenses that applied to any contract, 
such as unconscionability.” (footnote omitted)). 
 89. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller & Emily Sherwin, Arbitration’s 
Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and 
Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 871, 884 (2008) (“[E]very consumer 
contract with an arbitration clause also included a waiver of classwide arbitration.”). 
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worked to bar the consumer from filing or participating in a class 
action against it.90 
In general, however, U.S. courts must facilitate arbitrations, even 
when they prevent class actions. In AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion,91 the Supreme Court struck down California’s refusal to 
enforce AT&T’s arbitration clause on grounds that the clause was 
unconscionable because plaintiffs were denied a class proceeding.92 
Importantly for present purposes, AT&T’s arbitration clause was 
designed to make arbitration both fair and feasible for any plaintiff 
who wished to file an individual complaint against the company.93 
Specifically, in addition to other favorable features, AT&T agreed to 
pay all costs for nonfrivolous claims; arbitration was to occur in the 
claimant’s home county; all legal remedies were available in 
arbitration; and, in the event that the consumer received an award 
higher than what AT&T last offered in settlement, AT&T agreed to 
pay a minimum recovery of $7500 and twice the claimant’s attorney’s 
fees.94 The Concepcion decision is controversial and has generated 
considerable criticism on grounds that arbitration can potentially be 
used to erode consumers’ substantive rights.95 
Whatever the relative merits of the Concepcion critiques,96 this 
low-cost structure for resolving consumer disputes may be especially 
well-suited for handling subjective and heterogeneous harms, 
including privacy harms. As long as the financial costs of bringing an 
arbitration action are minimized or eliminated and the procedures 
adopted are fair to consumers, those plaintiffs who highly value their 
 
 90. Arbitration Agreements, 81 Fed. Reg. 32,830, 32,830 (proposed May 24, 2016). 
The implementation of this rule was abrogated by Congress following the 2016 elections. 
Act of Nov. 1, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-74, 131 Stat. 1243 (voiding the CFPB’s arbitration 
rule). 
 91. 563 U.S. 333 (2011). 
 92. Id. at 338, 340, 352. 
 93. Id. at 336–37. 
 94. Id. at 337. 
 95. See, e.g., Karen Weise, Consumer Protection Faces a ‘Tsunami’ in Court, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 27, 2012), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/document
/M35HLE3HBS3K [https://perma.cc/4WNB-NYLE] (quoting legal commentators 
describing the case as the most harmful in the history of consumer law, with the potential 
to virtually end class actions against businesses); Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T 
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion Impedes Access to Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703, 704 (2012) 
(“[I]f not legislatively limited, this case will substantially harm consumers, employees, and 
perhaps others.”). 
 96. I have elsewhere defended Concepcion on the grounds that California’s effective 
national control of the class waiver issue should be preempted in favor of federal 
treatment. Erin O’Hara O’Connor & Larry E. Ribstein, Preemption and Choice-of-Law 
Coordination, 111 MICH. L. REV. 647, 700–01 (2013). 
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privacy will have an incentive to bring claims. Those who place a low 
value on their privacy will not bring claims, but segregation of high- 
and low-value plaintiffs is desirable for more efficient pricing of 
privacy harms. 
Granted, this arbitration scheme only allows for a binary sorting 
between plaintiffs, whereas consumers may value data privacy along a 
continuum. If so, under the binary sorting, pure-efficiency pricing is 
not possible. Nevertheless, the binary sort could prove surprisingly 
effective in the context of privacy harms. Available empirical 
evidence seems to indicate that when it comes to valuing privacy, 
people seem to lie along a bimodal distribution.97 Some people value 
privacy very highly, whereas others seem to care little about privacy.98 
If consumer preferences are bimodal, then it is possible for a binary 
sorting mechanism to sort the two groups effectively. Of course, the 
effectiveness of this arbitral mechanism is highly sensitive to 
structure, including especially the costs and benefits of proceeding to 
arbitration and the remedies consumers can obtain there. But, if its 
features are carefully calibrated, Concepcion-type arbitration can 
“price discriminate” on the basis of subjective value, creating 
economic incentives that are more efficient than the present legal 
mechanisms used to protect privacy. 
Consider the following example. Suppose that consumers 
entered into a relationship with Company A, receiving its goods 
and/or services, and thereafter A sold the consumers’ data to a third 
party for use in behavioral marketing. Suppose further that at the 
time that this relationship formed, A’s privacy policy stated that the 
consumers’ information would not be shared with third parties. 
Alternatively, A’s privacy policy could have stated that the 
consumers’ information could be shared with third-party contractual 
affiliates, but it did not make clear that the company might sell the 
data to affiliates for use in behavioral marketing. In the first example, 
 
 97. See Patricia A. Norberg, Daniel R. Horne & David A. Horne, The Privacy 
Paradox: Personal Information Disclosure Intentions Versus Behaviors, 41 J. CONSUMER 
AFF. 100, 101 (2007) (examining the “discrepancy between individuals’ intentions to 
protect their own privacy and how they behave in the marketplace”). 
 98. See, e.g., Alessandro Acquisti, Leslie K. John & George Loewenstein, What is 
Privacy Worth?, 42 J. LEGAL STUD. 249, 252 (2013) (finding that consumer research 
subjects valued privacy more highly when anonymity was the default or initially-presented 
option than when disclosure was the default or first option); Jacob T. Biehl, Eleanor G. 
Rieffel & Adam J. Lee, When Privacy and Utility are in Harmony: Towards Better Design 
of Presence Technologies, 17 PERS. & UBIQUITOUS COMPUTING 503, 506–07 (2013) 
(finding that privacy preferences in the context of automatic detection of individuals’ 
presence in the workplace tended to be distributed bimodally). 
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the company might be subject to both private suit and to FTC 
enforcement action for deception. In the second example, the 
company might be subject to private suit and to FTC enforcement 
action for both deceptive and unfair trade practices. Under this 
proposal, an arbitration scheme could displace both private and 
public actions in both examples. As an efficiency matter, the scheme 
works best when the privacy harms are heterogeneous and hard to 
forecast and where there are potential offsetting commercial benefits 
to consumers from A’s actions. 
In short, Concepcion-type arbitration can be superior to FTC 
enforcement actions because it enables the sorting of consumer harms 
and the pricing rather than outright prohibition of activities that 
produce such harms, thus leaving greater product/service flexibility 
for companies. And it can be superior to class actions because it does 
not lump all consumers together for damage-assessment purposes. As 
a result, subjective harms can be legally recognized and vindicated 
without over-deterring corporate conduct. A problem exists with this 
“sorting” mechanism, however, in that, at best, it only imperfectly 
sorts consumers. No doubt some consumers who place a high value 
on privacy but face high opportunity costs to their time will still not 
bring claims, whereas some consumers who place a low value on 
privacy but who face low opportunity costs would bring their claims. 
It is possible that the two mismatched groups would serve to cancel 
one another out, and calibration of the rules for recovery can help to 
mitigate this problem. Nevertheless, the mismatch, and some 
potential effects, will likely remain. Section II.C below explores one 
possible market mechanism that carries the potential of alleviating 
this weakness. 
B. The Importance of FTC Oversight and Voluntary Participation by 
Firms 
Because arbitral mechanisms can be unfair to consumers, the 
FTC should oversee and monitor the proposed arbitration to ensure it 
is consumer-friendly. Courts typically oversee the fundamental 
fairness of arbitration with a variety of doctrines applied to the 
enforcement of arbitration agreements and awards. 99  However, 
because the scheme envisioned here would also displace 
administrative orders, the FTC should play a much more active 
oversight role. Consumer protections are particularly important 
 
 99. DRAHOZAL, supra note 68, at 106–52 (examining general contract law defenses to 
arbitration agreements). 
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under the proposal because FTC-approved arbitration would take 
away consumer litigation rights even without the consumers’ consent 
to arbitration. Whatever the effectiveness of consumer consent to 
arbitration in other contexts, it might well be wholly absent here. 
Specifically, in order to replace both class actions and FTC 
enforcement orders, the FTC would have to approve the basic 
structure, applicable procedural rules (which could be adapted from 
any number of off-the-rack procedural rules promulgated by private 
arbitral organizations), and cost allocations. FTC	oversight could 
provide the opportunity to introduce an arbitral mechanism that is 
more fair to consumers than that seen in the context of purely private 
arbitration. At a minimum, a record of the arbitrated dispute and the 
basis of a consumer’s claim should be publicly available. The arbitral 
mechanism might even include an affirmative obligation to notify the 
company’s consumers, in order to ensure that high-value consumers 
will have knowledge about their own claims. Consumers can be given 
more liberal rights of discovery as well as other rights that protect 
their ability to vindicate claims. 
FTC-approved consumer arbitration already exists for many 
automobile purchasers. The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act 100 
provides a set of obligations that manufacturers must comply with 
when entering into a warranty with the consumer. 101  The Act 
encourages the use of informal dispute resolution mechanisms and 
directs the FTC to prescribe rules setting forth minimum standards 
for dispute resolution programs utilized by companies and described 
in their warranties.102 Pursuant to this direction, the FTC promulgated 
such minimum standards, which include an annual audit of the 
program to ensure its compliance with the guidelines.103 Several of the 
leading automobile manufacturers have instituted the Automobile 
Warranty Arbitration Program, which handles consumer disputes 
regarding automobile warranties.104 The program is administered by 
 
 100. Magnuson-Moss Warranty—Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, Pub. 
L. No. 93–637, 88 Stat. 2183 (1975) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§	2301–12 (2012)). 
 101. Id. §§	102–108, 88 Stat. at 2185–89. 
 102. Id. §	110(a), 88 Stat. at 2189. 
 103. FTC Informal Dispute Settlement Procedures Rule, 16 C.F.R. §	703.7 (2017). 
 104. The FTC makes available the most recent audit of this arbitration program, which 
includes a general discussion of the program. See CLAVERHOUSE ASSOCS., 2015 AUDIT 
OF THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (AUTOMOBILE WARRANTY 
ARBITRATION PROGRAM) 3–4 (2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports
/2015-audit-national-center-dispute-settlement-automobile-warranty-arbitration-program
/2015_ftc_national_audit.pdf [https://perma.cc/UFX4-39ZP]. 
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the National Center for Dispute Settlement,105 which undergoes the 
annual FTC-mandated audit in order to remain approved.106 
The arbitration program standards applicable under the 
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act are designed for companies to adopt 
ex ante, so that the warranty agreement between the company and 
the consumer actually contains an arbitration clause.107 Moreover, the 
approved arbitral mechanism must be nonbinding, according to the 
FTC’s rules.108 In contrast, the proposed mechanism for privacy claims 
would be binding, meaning that the consumers lose their rights to 
bring class actions. Also in contrast to automobile arbitration, a 
privacy-claim arbitral mechanism could, at least in theory, be either 
put in place ex ante (prior to any privacy violation) or ex post (as a 
settlement technique for FTC enforcement actions, to be used in lieu 
of FTC enforcement orders). Companies heavily enmeshed in the 
gathering and storage of data (i.e., Google, Facebook, etc.) might 
obtain generalized approval for specific types of future claims/actions, 
much as the automobile manufacturers have done for warranty 
disputes. Other companies might not be able to forecast a significant 
likelihood of FTC enforcement actions. In order for the arbitral 
scheme to work for them, the target companies would have to 
negotiate with the FTC for an arbitral mechanism after 
complaints/investigations materialize. Presumably these ex post 
arbitral schemes could benefit from the guidance provided by ex ante 
mechanisms. Alternatively, the FTC could set up its own arbitral 
 
 105. See id. at 4. Other major American automobile manufacturers utilize the Better 
Business Bureau (“BBB”) Auto Line arbitration program. See Agency Information 
Collection Activities, 82 Fed. Reg. 8614, 8615 (Jan. 26, 2017) (identifying the two 
arbitration programs operating under the FTC’s Dispute Resolution Rule as the National 
Center for Dispute Settlement and the BBB Auto Line program); see also Participating 
Auto Manufacturers, BETTER BUS. BUREAU, https://www.bbb.org/autoline/bbb-auto-line-
process/participating-auto-manufacturers/ [https://perma.cc/R99S-Q47P] (listing over two 
dozen participating manufacturers).  
 106. See 16 C.F.R. §	703.7(a). 
 107. Cf. Cunningham v. Fleetwood Homes of Ga., Inc., 253 F.3d 611, 622 (11th Cir. 
2001) (holding that the failure to disclose in the warranty a term or clause requiring the 
utilization of an informal dispute resolution mechanism “contravenes the text, legislative 
history, and purpose of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act”). 
 108. 16 C.F.R. §	703.5(j). Binding arbitration is, however, not precluded by the 
regulations as long as both parties agree to it. See Rules, Regulations, Statements, and 
Interpretations Under Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 40 Fed. Reg. 60,167, 60,211 (Dec. 
31, 1975) (clarifying that a warrantor and a consumer could agree to submit their dispute 
to binding arbitration either after the Mechanism has rendered a decision or instead of 
proceeding under the Mechanism, but that binding arbitration may not be mentioned in 
the written warranty). 
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mechanisms that companies could opt into as part of its settlement 
with the FTC or as part of the company’s contract with consumers. 
FTC oversight can prevent a number of potential problems that 
might arise for company-instituted arbitration. When enforcing 
arbitration agreements in consumer contracts, courts often seek to 
ensure that firms do not fashion unfair processes,109 and the FTC 
should assume that role under this scheme. In addition, courts are 
sometimes concerned about a potential repeat-player effect, which 
can arise when the company participates in repeated arbitrations but 
the consumers each participate only once.110 To obtain the firm’s 
repeat business, arbitrators’ determinations might unduly favor the 
firm.111 Potential repeat-player problems could be handled by having 
the FTC refer complaining consumers to a panel of potential lawyers 
who routinely handle claims in arbitration. In fact, if a given advocate 
represents multiple consumers who file similar claims against a firm, 
then the advocate could possibly aggregate those claims in order to 
achieve cost efficiencies. Alternatively, the FTC could decertify those 
arbitrators who show a bias in favor of company rulings. Making 
public the arbitration claims and rulings can help defuse the potential 
for repeat player bias. If the FTC sets up its own arbitration, it could 
hire consumer-friendly arbitrators. 
Furthermore, if a firm faces liability only to the extent that 
consumers are willing to file claims, the firm might have little 
incentive to alert consumers to the presence of the arbitration 
scheme. In order to overcome this difficulty, the FTC might require 
that the company widely distribute information about the arbitration 
option to consumers, at least once an FTC investigation and 
complaint indicates that remedial actions might be warranted. The 
FTC could also notify consumers of active arbitrations on its websites. 
 
 109. See DRAHOZAL, supra note 68, at 690. 
 110. See Mercuro v. Superior Court, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 671, 678–79 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) 
(striking the arbitration clause and noting that employer’s choice of arbitral forum 
resulted in only eight available arbitrators, which created a potential repeat player effect). 
 111. For discussions of a possible repeat player effect, see Lisa B. Bingham, 
Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 189, 209–
10 (1997); Lisa B. Bingham, On Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of 
Statistics in Judicial Review of Employment Arbitration Awards, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 
223, 238–39 (1998); Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: The Case Against 
Enforcement of Executory Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and Employees, 64 
UMKC L. REV. 449, 472–79 (1996); Alexander J.S. Colvin, An Empirical Study of 
Employment Arbitration: Case Outcomes and Processes, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 
14–15 (2011). The repeat-player problem can be mitigated by, for example, using a large 
pool of arbitrators or enlisting arbitration-experienced advocates to represent consumer 
interests. 
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Consumer advocates also might have a financial incentive to notify 
consumers of potential claims. 
Finally, the FTC might impose rules designed to ensure that 
consumers do not face overly-large costs to bringing claims. While 
opportunity and financial costs can operate as a valuable mechanism 
for sorting consumers who place high and low values on privacy, 
sorting requires that the effective costs to arbitration be low enough 
to attract high-privacy-value consumers. Thus, costs would need to be 
carefully scrutinized. Indeed, one requirement of the automobile 
warranty arbitration is that the consumer bear no financial costs to 
arbitrate.112 Perhaps overall administrative costs can be reduced with 
aggregated claims options through insurance and/or by enabling 
single arbitrators to handle multiple similar claims individually. 
Voluntary participation by firms is equally important. Assuming 
that the FTC seeks to oversee arbitration in the best interest of 
consumers,113 it would ensure that arbitrations are procedurally fair 
to, and protect the substantive rights of, consumers. However, 
excessive consumer rights could impose dispute resolution costs on 
firms that are so large that the overdeterrence problem mentioned 
earlier is not actually alleviated. If firms retain the right to opt into or 
out of an FTC-approved program, then any resulting arbitration 
mechanisms should be Pareto-superior114 to current legal enforcement 
mechanisms. Mechanically, firms could seek approval for proposed 
arbitration schemes, followed by FTC feedback and pushback, 
followed by a firm’s decision whether to participate in an arbitral 
scheme as shaped by the FTC. A credible threat not to participate in 
the FTC-shaped arbitration could enable a firm to negotiate to a 
mutually agreeable position with the FTC. Note that legal rules, 
 
 112. 16 C.F.R. §	703.3(a). However, this rule has been interpreted to allow for some 
costs to be placed on consumers, including “initially notifying the Mechanism of the 
dispute,	.	.	. provid[ing] the information needed by the Mechanism to fairly resolve the 
dispute[,]	.	.	.	. developing and submitting any rebuttal evidence,” and obtaining copies of 
any “Mechanism records relating to the dispute.” See Rules, Regulations, Statements, and 
Interpretations Under Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 40 Fed. Reg. 60,019, 60,204 (1975) 
(codified at 16 C.F.R. § 703). “Except for the cost of notifying the Mechanism and the cost 
of complying with reasonable requests for necessary information,” all other costs able to 
be placed on the consumer are voluntary costs and “the Mechanism will still render a 
decision” even if the consumer decides not to bear the costs. Id. 
 113. Consumer protection is the FTC’s charge, although agency capture theorists might 
challenge this assumption. For a discussion of agency capture in industries charged with 
consumer protection, see Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture 
Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 64–78 (2010). 
 114. Pareto-superior policies make some people better off without harming others. See 
David S. Bullock, Are Government Transfers Efficient? An Alternative Test of the Efficient 
Redistribution Hypothesis, 103 J. POL. ECON. 1236, 1237 (1995). 
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which force firms into court, would not achieve this important 
corporate buy-in. 
C. Third-Party Insurer/Monitors 
As mentioned in Section II.A above, the central problem with 
using arbitration to effectively price privacy is that the sorting 
mechanism will be imperfect. In particular, some decisions to file (or 
not to file) claims in arbitration will be motivated by the consumer’s 
opportunity costs as reflected in employment, wages, and other 
matters rather than by the degree to which the consumer actually 
values privacy. One way to treat this problem is to enable higher 
earning consumers to obtain higher arbitration awards than those 
awarded to lower earning consumers. Perhaps some privacy violations 
would naturally lead to such damage patterns (i.e., identity theft or 
loss of reputation/income), but categorically awarding damages based 
on the income of the claimant seems problematic due to perceived 
class discrimination. 
An alternative mechanism that could alleviate the mismatch 
between claims and privacy valuations would be claims insurance 
made available to consumers prior to the privacy violation(s) in 
question. With claims insurance, a third-party insurer would offer to 
prosecute arbitral claims on behalf of consumers for a premium paid 
prior to any actual privacy violations that affect the consumer. In the 
event that the arbitral mechanism becomes available to plaintiffs who 
were harmed by violations, the insurer would undertake a duty to 
bring claims on behalf of insured consumers and to pay over to 
consumers some or all of any amounts collected on behalf of the 
consumer. Ex ante, consumers are much more likely to purchase such 
insurance based on their valuation of privacy protections rather than 
based on opportunity costs. Indeed, to the extent that opportunity 
costs do influence the ex ante insurance decision, it will be in the 
direction of having high-privacy-value, high-opportunity-cost 
individuals be more inclined to pay the premium. 
Claims insurers might also advocate for greater substantive 
privacy protections on behalf of their customers. With strong 
reputations as privacy advocates, the insurers can attract more high-
privacy-value customers. Indeed, it is conceivable that some firms 
wishing to signal that they respect consumer privacy might facilitate 
the insurer’s services or even offer to pay the insurance premiums on 
behalf of the customers. However, this type of signaling will require a 
regulatory regime that preserves the firm’s growth and innovation 
possibilities. 
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If the third-party insurer files claims on behalf of all its 
consumers, perhaps the insurer should be permitted to aggregate 
these claims. With a sufficiently successful insurance option, the 
aggregated claims could begin to resemble a class claim. Nevertheless, 
the insurer’s aggregated or “class” claim would have the advantage of 
including only high-privacy-value plaintiffs. As a result, the 
difficulties posed in the class actions described above would not be 
present. 
If the insurer is permitted to aggregate its customers’ claims, then 
arbitrators could perhaps charge claimants at least modest 
administrative fees to help cover the costs of arbitration. These fees 
could help to discourage low-privacy-value, low-opportunity-cost 
plaintiffs from free-riding off the efforts of the privacy advocates after 
an aggregate claim has been filed. At the same time, if the costs are 
sufficiently modest, some high-privacy-value consumers who did not 
purchase insurance on the front end could file claims once a 
company’s privacy violation has become apparent. Under such a 
scheme, it is at least theoretically possible that the high-privacy-value 
consumers purchase insurance, leading to feasible claims prosecution, 
or add their claims after the fact, and the low-privacy-value 
consumers are effectively foreclosed from asserting claims. 
Note that under a third-party insurance scheme, the insurance 
effectively serves as the pricing mechanism, while the arbitration is 
merely a consumer-friendly forum, which serves to substitute away 
from the overdeterrence problems associated with the conjunction of 
class actions and FTC enforcement orders. If the arbitration scheme 
were available after an FTC investigation determined that the 
company had committed a privacy violation, these are the very cases 
where both FTC actions and class action claims are currently likely, 
and this conjunction represents the greatest risk of overdeterrence. 
The proposed arbitration mechanism corrects the overdeterrence 
problem by eliminating the conjunction, effectively substituting 
property-rule FTC enforcement for liability rules, and preventing 
class awards from assuming that all customers place a high value on 
privacy. 
Even if the overdeterrence problem can be corrected, or at least 
substantially ameliorated with the proposed arbitration, what about 
the potential for underdeterrence? Under the current enforcement 
regime, underdeterrence can result from a number of sources, 
including inevitable budget constraints and other scarce resources for 
the FTC. Currently, class actions are available to supplement FTC 
enforcement efforts, thereby helping to ameliorate underdeterrence 
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problems. To help ease the potential for underdeterrence, the pre-
negotiated arbitration scheme should replace consumer class actions 
even in cases where the FTC has not filed a complaint against the 
company. In short, insurers and harmed consumers should have 
independent enforcement authority. If so, then the class arbitration 
would serve to lessen both overdeterrence (by sorting claimants) and 
underdeterrence (by providing investigation and enforcement 
independent of the FTC). 
The question remains whether there can be a market for third-
party claims insurance. In order for such a market to exist, there must 
be (1) an absence of legal barriers to the offering of such insurance 
(fueling the supply side); (2) an absence of, or ability to eliminate the 
risks of adverse selection and moral hazard;115 and (3) a sufficiently 
large pool of high-privacy-value consumers who are willing to 
purchase the insurance (fueling the demand side). Assuming no legal 
barriers to the offering of claims insurance,116 are there adverse 
selection or moral hazard problems? Adverse selection problems117 
do not really apply to consumers, who are not exhibiting risks 
relevant to the insurance premium.118 Moral hazard problems119 could 
arise under our proposed scheme if consumers who purchase claims 
insurance are less likely to take measures to protect their own privacy 
in situations where both firms and consumers should take care to 
protect privacy. Presumably either the scope of the claims coverage or 
 
 115. See, e.g., Tom Baker, Containing the Promise of Insurance: Adverse Selection and 
Risk Classification, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 371, 373–74 (2003). 
 116. In the United States, this is called a prepaid legal service plan. See generally John 
R. Dunne, Prepaid Legal Services Have Arrived, 4 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1 (1975) (describing 
the advent and development of prepaid legal services); Brian Heid & Eitan Misulovin, The 
Group Legal Plan Revolution: Bright Horizon or Dark Future?, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. 
L.J. 335 (2000) (discussing the details and recent growth of prepaid group legal plans 
which allow the spreading of legal services among many to make them more affordable). 
 117. Adverse selection refers to the “theoretical tendency for low risk individuals to 
avoid or drop out of insurance pools.” Baker, supra note 115, at 373. 
 118. The result of adverse selection is that insurance pools, absent countervailing 
efforts by administrators, tend to contain a disproportionate percentage of high-risk 
individuals. Id. In the context of insurance claims, however, consumers presumably do not 
possess asymmetric information about the risk that firms they deal with will violate 
consumer privacy rights. As a result, all consumers theoretically share equally in the 
information that firms may violate consumer privacy rights, thereby rending all consumers 
“at-risk.” 
 119. Moral hazard refers to the “change in incentives that can result from insurance 
protection.” Id. There tends to be an inversely proportional relationship between 
protection and risk, whereby “[r]isks that pose a very high degree of moral hazard 
typically are not insurable at all,” such as intentional harm. Id. at 374. 
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the applicable rules applied to the privacy claim could take into 
account the mutual care issue, where it is present.120 
The most pressing potential impediment to the rise of a third-
party insurance market is the possibility that too few consumers value 
privacy highly enough to purchase such insurance. The greater the 
number of consumers who are willing to purchase the insurance, the 
cheaper the premium, given that aggregation of consumer claims in 
arbitration should reduce the costs per consumer of prosecuting 
future claims. Available empirical evidence indicates that although 
consumers often express opinions that suggest they place a high value 
on privacy, in practice consumers tend to be willing to pay relatively 
little for privacy protections. 121  At the same time consumer 
willingness to sign away privacy rights appears to be heavily 
contingent on the framing of the issue.122  Specifically, consumer 
willingness to share data can turn on the playfulness of the website 
design or the specific pieces of information over which consumers are 
given control.123 One way that third-party insurers might be able to 
induce consumers to purchase the insurance is to overcome consumer 
ignorance of the risks they face by calling to mind specific risks to 
consumers.124 
Plaintiffs’ claims insurance does not seem to exist in the U.S., 
although that is likely due to the fact that contingency fees serve to 
minimize risks for plaintiffs.125 In Germany, where contingency fees 
are not permitted, plaintiff-side litigation insurance is common.126 
 
 120. See id. at 373–74 (explaining that insurers often require the consumers to 
relinquish control, such as over the settlement and defense of claims, or retain 
“coinsurance” to protect from moral hazard problems). It helps that the claims coverage 
conceived here gives the insurer, rather than the consumer, control over the litigation 
decision. See id.  
 121. Acquisti et al., supra note 54, at 41; Norberg et al., supra note 97, at 103, 118. 
 122. See Somini Sengupta, Letting Down Our Guard, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2013, at 
BU1. 
 123. Id. (explaining, for example, the increased willingness to provide identifying 
information such as date of birth on Facebook). 
 124. Cf. Timothy Morey, Theodore Forbath & Allison Schoop, Customer Data: 
Designing for Transparency and Trust, HARV. BUS. REV. (May 2015), https://hbr.org/2015
/05/customer-data-designing-for-transparency-and-trust [https://perma.cc/KLV7-HPLC] 
(noting that consumers are typically ignorant of the specific types of data sharing and uses 
to which they are subject). 
 125. Cf. Samuel R. Gross, We Could Pass a Law .	.	. What Might Happen if Contingent 
Legal Fees were Banned, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 321, 330–35 (1998) (discussing the 
relationship between contingent fees and plaintiffs’ litigation insurance). 
 126. Forty percent of West German households studied in 1979 had purchased 
insurance covering at least some legal expenses. Erhard Blankenburg, Legal Insurance, 
Litigant Decisions, and the Rising Caseload of Courts: A West German Study, 16 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 601, 605 (1981–82). 
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Additionally, the costs to providing claims insurance would be smaller 
where fee shifting is permitted, a common feature in private 
arbitration 127  that could be incorporated into FTC-approved 
arbitration mechanisms. In the end, the development, or not, of a 
claims insurance market could itself provide useful empirical evidence 
of the extent to which consumers actually value privacy protection. 
D. Other Complications and Objections Considered 
What are other potential objections to such an arbitration 
scheme? Even if arbitration could work well in some circumstances, 
are there circumstances where it should not be used? This Section 
considers possible objections and complications and concludes that, 
while some may limit the circumstances in which the proposed 
scheme could be feasibly implemented, none provide compelling 
arguments against experimentation. 
1.  Arbitration Schemes Risk Potential Underdeterrence 
If too few consumer claims are filed in arbitration, privacy 
violations would be underdeterred.128 This potential problem should 
be treated within the arbitration scheme rather than rejecting 
arbitration altogether. If significant numbers of consumers who claim 
to place a high value on their privacy nevertheless fail to come 
forward, the problem could result either from costs associated with 
the arbitration or a failure to effectively inform consumers of their 
right to redress. Arbitration costs can be addressed over time by 
tailoring the cost structure of the arbitration. Information problems 
can be addressed through joint efforts by the firm, the FTC, and 
 
 127. See O’Hara O’Connor et al., supra note 71, at 164–66 (evaluating an empirical 
study of arbitration clauses in CEO employment contracts and finding that many either 
provided for or assumed the possibility of attorney fee-shifting). 
 128. For an example of this charge, see the CFPB’s recent report to Congress on the 
use of arbitration clauses in consumer financial instruments. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. 
BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO CONGRESS, PURSUANT TO DODD-FRANK 
WALL STREET REFORM & CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT §	1028(A) app. A, at 7 (2015) 
(“[C]ritics argue that arbitration clauses	.	.	. may undermine deterrence and leave 
widespread wrongdoing against consumers unaddressed.”). The CFPB presents findings 
indicating that litigation outcomes are more successful for consumers than are individual 
arbitration outcomes. Id. §	1, at 11–15. The development of a claims insurance market 
under the proposed scheme could produce better incentives because it would allow 
aggregation, similar to class actions, without enabling plaintiffs’ attorneys to demand 
damages for low-privacy-value plaintiffs. See Thomas H. Koenig & Michael L. Rustad, 
Fundamentally Unfair: An Empirical Analysis of Social Media, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
341, 370 (2014) (“[P]redispute arbitration clauses .	.	. discourage filings—therefore 
shielding [companies] from any accountability for breach of [terms of use], tort claims, 
intellectual property rights, privacy violations, or other causes of action.”). 
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plaintiffs’ advocate/lawyers to disseminate information about firm 
violations and the arbitration option. If, notwithstanding well-drafted 
arbitration schemes and significant efforts to disseminate information, 
many consumers fail to step forward to exercise their rights through 
arbitration, through insurance schemes or otherwise, it may be 
reasonable to conclude that the passive consumers do not, in fact, 
value their privacy at sufficiently high values to register their 
grievances and collect compensation. That revelation would not be 
one of underdeterrence but rather of overprotection of privacy with 
formal legal rules. If there are specific contexts where 
underdeterrence seems particularly likely or costly, the FTC might 
refuse to displace its regulatory authority or may refuse to permit the 
use of the arbitral scheme. 
2.  Privacy Should Be Protected via Property Rules, Not Liability 
Rules 
Privacy advocates might object to the use of liability rather than 
property rules to protect privacy on grounds that consumers who 
value privacy at high levels will not be satisfied with ex post monetary 
awards when that privacy is violated. After all, the creepiness or loss 
of dignity associated with privacy violations may be incommensurable 
with money. 129  Although this objection could limit the political 
feasibility of this arbitration scheme, it should not displace 
experimentation altogether. As some scholars have pointed out, one 
difficulty with obtaining consumer consent for the use of data is that 
consumers often do not know until after the fact whether they will 
object to particular uses of their data simply because it is too hard to 
imagine all possible data uses at the time that consent is obtained.130 
In this world where consumers cannot forecast future privacy harms, 
even high-value consumers might agree to liability rules, which can 
judge corporate actions after the fact, when it is known how the 
information was used, and by whom. 
 
 129. Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Information Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 
STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1398 (2000); Clyde W. Summers, Individualism, Collectivism and 
Autonomy in American Labor Law, 5 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y 453, 483 (2001). 
 130. See Andrew W. Bagley & Justin S. Brown, Limited Consumer Privacy Protections 
Against the Lawyers of Big Data, 31 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L. J. 483, 
496–97, 518–19 (2014) (“[C]onsenting [consumers seem] to be making a long-term 
commitment to the control of their data by other parties for uses that are unimaginable at 
the time of consent.”). 
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3.  Actual Fraud/Intentional Deceit Should Still Be Enjoined 
The arbitration scheme works best in cases where it is important 
to carefully calibrate firm incentives such as unintentional disclosure 
of private consumer information. Instances in which overdeterrence is 
less problematic, such as intentional wrongdoing, may be better 
regulated by the current regulatory scheme. In cases alleging fraud or 
intentional deception, however, the FTC or other enforcing plaintiff 
should be required to show fraudulent intent on the part of the target 
firm, and that intent must be present at the time that the firm issued 
its disclosures, privacy policies, etc. These are standard elements of 
common law fraud,131 so the limitation is in no way radical. But the 
important point is that the FTC should not be able to claim 
“deception” or “unfairness” without satisfying the elements of 
common law fraud, in cases where the arbitration scheme is not 
permitted. 
4.  Protection of Health Information Should Not Require Affirmative 
Action by Patients 
Consumer preferences may be significantly less heterogeneous 
regarding the use and dissemination of at least some forms of health 
information, and, on average, patients appear to highly value 
protection of their health information. 132  Without heterogeneous 
preferences, the problems associated with consumer valuation are 
somewhat mitigated, and with high valuations, the potential 
overdeterrence problem is also mitigated. Under these circumstances 
the case against the current regime of FTC enforcement orders and 
class actions fades. 
Yet, perhaps arbitration mechanisms should at least be 
considered as an option for those health privacy violations that trigger 
very different responses across patient populations. For example, 
while a healthy majority of patients might be uncomfortable sharing 
their mental health histories and problems, patients might face 
heterogeneous preferences about the disclosure of other conditions 
 
 131. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
 132. Joy L. Pritts, The Importance and Value of Protecting the Privacy of Health 
Information: The Roles of the HIPAA Privacy Rule and the Common Rule in Health 
Research, DIVISION OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS. OF SCI. ENGINEERING, & MED. 1, 
5–8 (2008) http://iom.nationalacademics.org/~/media/Files/Activity%20Files/Research
/HIPAAandResearch/PrittsPrivacyFinalDraftwed.ashx [https://perma.cc/BAC6-5J2B] 
(discussing the importance of protecting the privacy of health information by reviewing 
public attitudes toward the privacy of health information and discusses the value that 
privacy serves in the health case context). 
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like ear infections or headaches. In these circumstances, 
heterogeneous preferences and the possibility of overdeterrence for 
some health data uses are present, indicating that the arbitration 
mechanism could improve matters. 
Moreover, many of the security breach issues for medicine are 
similar to those found in the general commercial context. Medical 
records routinely contain Social Security numbers, addresses, and 
next of kin, and access to insurance information facilitates the filing of 
fraudulent claims, making medical data every bit as valuable to 
hackers as commercial data. 133  In fact, healthcare organizations 
accounted for nearly half of all major data breaches in 2014,134 which 
suggests that differential treatment across the board may not be 
warranted. 
5.  Security Beaches Cause Externalities by Encouraging Hacking of 
All Firms, and Arbitration is Unlikely to Capture that Cost 
Incentives to hack may be present regardless of the incidence of 
actual breaches. That said, firms with more highly-valued information 
should make more efforts to protect consumer data from potential 
hackers. A well-constructed arbitration scheme should be able to sort 
these firms from those with low-value information. Moreover, a well-
constructed arbitration scheme should be better able to value 
consumer privacy, especially in the face of heterogeneous consumer 
privacy values. Security breaches capture a lot of press attention, and 
they cause widespread concern among consumers, at least in the short 
term.135 For these reasons it may not be politically feasible to relegate 
 
 133. Caroline Humer & Jim Finkle, Your Medical Record is Worth More to Hackers 
than Your Credit Card, REUTERS (Sept. 24, 2014, 2:25 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article
/2014/09/24/us-cybersecurity-hospitals-idUSKCN0HJ21I20140924 [https://perma.cc/D8D7-
3UM9]. 
 134. Greg Slabodkin, 2014 Was Landmark Year for Health Data Breaches, HEALTH 
DATA MGMT. (Dec. 26, 2014, 7:46 AM), http://www.healthdatamanagement.com/news
/2014-Landmark-Year-for-Health-Data-Breaches-49505-1.html [https://perma.cc/CAQ9-
4FXB]. 
 135. See, e.g., Melanie Eversley & Kim Hjelmgaard, Target Confirms Massive Credit-
Card Data Breach, USA TODAY (Dec. 19, 2013), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news
/nation/2013/12/18/secret-service-target-data-breach/4119337/ [https://perma.cc/SU3P-
9WP9]; Greg Farrell & Patricia Hurtado, JP Morgan’s 2014 Hack Ties to Largest Cyber 
Breach Ever, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, (Nov. 10, 2015), https://www.bloomberg.com
/news/articles/2015-11-10/hackers-accused-by-u-s-of-targeting-top-banks-mutual-funds 
[https://perma.cc/PW7Y-DHUV (staff uploaded archive)]; Gordon Kelly, eBay Suffers 
Massive Security Breach, All Users Must Change Their Passwords, FORBES (May 21, 
2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/gordonkelly/2014/05/21/ebay-suffers-massive-security-
breach-all-users-must-their-change-passwords/ [https://perma.cc/92C9-UGGN]; Jeff John 
Roberts, Home Depot to Pay Banks $25 Million in Data Breach Settlement, FORTUNE 
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claims involving data security breaches to the more private forum of 
arbitration. On the other hand, public attention to company behaviors 
can be achieved through other mechanisms. For example, perhaps 
political issues can be handled by calling firm leaders to explain 
themselves to Congressional committees, with testimony aired by C-
SPAN and other news channels. If so, public shaming can provide 
additional incentives for companies to take care, suggesting that 
arbitration could potentially work here too. 
6.  The Arbitration Scheme Would Require Congressional Action 
and Therefore Could Flounder Politically 
The proposed arbitration might well require congressional 
action. Current FTC authority does not extend to the imposition of 
monetary liability, and although the FTC presumably could promise 
to refrain from section 5 enforcement actions in return for any 
number of firm promises, its oversight role in the arbitration scheme 
likely would require congressional action. Current and past 
arbitration schemes monitored by the FTC were affirmatively 
authorized and directed by Congress in the Magnuson-Moss 
Warranty Act,136 so they do not provide precedent for FTC authority 
to institute or manage the arbitration of privacy claims. Moreover, if 
the arbitration scheme works to displace class actions, congressional 
authorization could similarly be required. Currently, individual 
arbitration can replace class actions under the FAA, but that statute’s 
operation requires an agreement to arbitrate between the parties,137 
whereas the proposed arbitration scheme would operate even in the 
absence of consumer agreement. As a consequence, separate 
statutory authorization would be required. 
Several consumer privacy statutes have, of late, been thwarted in 
Congress, and this one could also flounder. Industry advocates have 
killed recently proposed statutes that stalled in congressional 
 
(Mar. 9, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/03/09/home-depot-data-breach-banks/ 
[https://perma.cc/Z5PV-PQFF (staff-uploaded archive)]; Jonathan Stempel & Jim Finkle, 
Yahoo Says All Three Billion Accounts Hacked in 2013 Data Theft, REUTERS (Oct. 3, 
2017), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-yahoo-cyber/yahoo-says-all-three-billion-accounts-
hacked-in-2013-data-theft-idUSKCN1C82O1 [https://perma.cc/KB5U-LTAT]; Gillian B. 
White, A Cybersecurity Breach at Equifax Left Pretty Much Everyone’s Financial Data 
Vulnerable, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/achrive
/2017/09/Equifax-cybersecurity-breach/539178/ [https://perma.cc/KR4U-AAT4]. 
 136. Magnuson-Moss Warranty—Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, Pub. 
L. No. 93-637 §	110(a), 88 Stat. 2183, 2189–90 (1975) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§	2310(a) (2012)). 
 137. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 2–4 (2012). 
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committee.138 Unlike other bills, however, this proposal circumvents 
the status quo only if companies agree to arbitration. Because this 
scheme costs firms nothing unless they affirmatively choose to 
participate, proposed legislation should experience less industry 
resistance. To the extent this proposal threatens to replace the current 
tools for privacy advocates, however, it could fail to garner the 
requisite support for passage. On the other hand, with the promise of 
FTC oversight and the prospect of greater protection for high-
privacy-value consumers, a carefully formulated proposed scheme 
could become a grand bargain between industry and privacy 
advocates. 
7.  Arbitration Might Be a Poor Forum for Law Creation 
Arbitration is not generally viewed to be a superior forum for the 
development of law because it is typically closed to the public and an 
arbitrator’s decision generally does not create precedent.139 Privacy 
law is underdeveloped and must pay very careful attention to 
technological advances, so one might conclude that privacy law needs 
to advance considerably before an arbitration option could perform 
well.140 This critique suggests, at a minimum, that privacy arbitrations 
should be open to the public and arbitrators should be required to 
follow FTC statements about sound privacy policy. Public 
participation and FTC evaluation of the legal principles developed in 
arbitration can both help to steer legal development in healthy, 
carefully-deliberated directions. Because the arbitrators can develop 
an expertise in the area of privacy, their decisions might well prove 
superior to those of generalist judges. And if the firms want 
assurances of predictable legal rules, the arbitrators could adopt a 
system of precedent. The inability of firms to appeal the arbitrator’s 
decision might cause the firms to be wary of agreeing to the 
arbitration scheme, so perhaps an option to appeal to the FTC 
 
 138. See, e.g., John Brodkin, For Sale: Your Private Browsing History, ARS TECHNICA 
(Mar. 28, 2017), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2017/03/for-sale-your-private-browsing
-history/ [https://perma.cc/DZA8-6J5H] (quoting U.S. Representative Mike Doyle as 
stating that many companies rely on lobbying efforts to defeat privacy bills); Kate 
Tummarello, ‘Big Data’ Lobbyist: Congress Doesn’t Want Online Privacy Law, THE HILL 
(Aug. 19, 2014), http://thehill.com/policy/technology/215457-big-data-lobbyist-congress-
doesnt-want-online-privacy-law [https://perma.cc/XS8D-A6BZ] (“A lobbyist for one of 
the top companies that trades in consumer data is confident that Congress won’t set rules 
for how online marketers use information about consumers.”); see also supra note 3. 
 139. Christopher R. Drahozal, Is Arbitration Lawless, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 187, 207–14 
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Commissioners could be incorporated.141 In any event, more careful 
thought on this front is highly advisable. 
CONCLUSION 
A critical missing component of the regulation of consumer data 
use is a pricing mechanism. The FTC, consumer advocates, and 
plaintiffs’ attorneys all correctly assert that privacy protection is an 
important goal of sound government policies, but translating that 
norm into the realm of consumer data use is difficult. Privacy harms 
are subjective, and consumers seem to vary significantly in their 
attitudes toward many uses of consumer data. The subjective nature 
of privacy harms can lead the FTC and the courts to not impose 
damages or restrictions on firm behavior, even when that the firm’s 
actions cause harm. When the government does regulate consumer 
data use out of a commitment to privacy, it likely ends up 
overregulating firm behavior, given that consumer harm is 
heterogeneous. Without an effective pricing mechanism, the risk of 
any one government actor’s decision causing overdeterrence or 
underdeterrence remains significant. Given that multiple government 
actors can effectively regulate firm behavior, the overdeterrence risk 
seems more likely. 
This Article offers a separate regulatory possibility that could 
incorporate a pricing/sorting mechanism into consumer redress for 
privacy harms: FTC-approved mandatory arbitration of consumer 
claims that would replace both FTC enforcement orders and class 
action litigation. In particular, the arbitration mechanism proposed 
here would seek to set an effective “price” for redress, in terms of 
both opportunity costs and out-of-pocket expenses, that would enable 
high-privacy-value consumers to bring claims while foreclosing those 
by low-privacy-value consumers. The sorting mechanism here is 
imperfect, however, because it would have a tendency to also sort 
claimants according to the opportunity costs of their time rather than 
solely according to their preferences regarding privacy. A third-party 
consumer claims insurance mechanism, under which the third party 
obtains an ex ante premium from the consumer and, in return, agrees 
to prosecute claims on behalf of the consumer in the event of a firm 
privacy violation, could work to more effectively sort the high- and 
low-privacy-value consumers. A question remains whether such a 
 
 141. Of course, this option might add to the FTC’s administrative burden, but 
arbitration fees paid by the companies could enable the hiring of support personnel to 
assist. 
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complicated mechanism is viable. Experimentation with the FTC-
approved arbitration should nevertheless proceed to make room for 
the possibility of a regulatory regime that, at least in some quarters, 
might substantially improve the pricing of privacy. 
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